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ABSTRACT 
Cultural relativism, which has been discussed in the different modes of thought for 
many years by a great number of philosophers, greets the eye as one of the crucial 
subjects of philosophy. Whilst a number of philosophers have a tendency for 
supporting it, the other majority takes a critical stance towards it as opponents. But it is 
still unclear whether or not it may be possible to find a way out in order to assert that 
there could be a middle way. As the third group, the philosophers, who argue that there 
could be a middle way to discuss the matter, strongly take an attention of two 
categories concerning cultural relativism, namely descriptive and normative cultural 
relativism. Since descriptive cultural relativism is just due diligence, that is, it is only 
interested in the factual observations on cultures and it reports what it notes without 
any judgments and evaluations, descriptive cultural relativism says normatively nothing 
on the moral dimensions of cultures and societies. It may be the best way that the 
general proclivity to evaluate the matter is to focus on the arguments for/against to 
most specifically normative cultural relativism. In this paper, what we have tried to do is 
to emphasize the arguments for and against to normative cultural relativism so as to 
show whether or not it is sound and supportable.      
Key words: Cultural relativism, diversity, tolerance, Gilbert Harman, Hitler, internal 
and external norms. 
 
NORMATİF KÜLTÜREL GÖRECELİK ÜZERİNE ELEŞTİREL BİR BAKIŞ 
ÖZET 
Yıllardır değişik düşünce biçimleri altında, büyük bir filozof topluluğu tarafından 
tartışılan kültürel görecilik, hala felsefenin en önemli konularından birisi olarak göze 
çarpmaktadır. Bir takım filozoflar, onu savunmaya yönelik bir temayüle sahipken, diğer 
bir çoğunluk ise muhalif olarak ona eleştirel bir tavır takınmıştır. Ancak, konuyla ilgili 
orta bir yolun varlığını iddia etmek için bir çıkış yolunun bulunup bulunamayacağı hala 
belirsizdir. Çözüme dair ileri sürülen üçüncü bir bakış açısı olarak, konuyu tartışmak için 
orta bir yolun bulunabileceğine ilişkin görüşü savunan filozoflar güçlü bir şekilde 
kültürel görecelikle ilgili olan iki kategoriye, betimleyici ve normatif kültürel görecilik, 
dikkat çekerler. Betimleyici kültürel görecilik sadece durum tespiti olduğu, yani, sadece 
kültürler üzerine olgusal gözlemlerle ilgilendiği ve her hangi bir şekilde onlara ilişkin 
değerlendirme ve yargılamalarda bulunmadan not aldığı şeyi rapor ettiği için, normatif 
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olarak kültürler ve toplumların ahlaki boyutları hakkında bir şey söylemez. Meseleyi 
sağlıklı şekilde değerlendirmek için özellikle normatif kültürel göreceliğin lehinde ve 
aleyhinde serdedilmiş argümanlara yoğunlaşmak belki de en iyi yoldur. Bu makalede 
yapmaya çalıştığımız şey normatif kültürel göreceliğin lehte ve aleyhte argümanlarına 
vurgu yaparak, onun anlamlı ve savunulabilir olup olmadığını göstermek olmuştur. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kültürel görecilik, farklılık, tolerans, Gilbert Harman, Hitler, dâhili 




Since ancient times, relativism has been strongly discussed in the 
different modes of thought by a number of philosophers. Protagoras (481-420 
BC), who was one of them, claimed that “man is the measure of all things.” 
The sentence can be taken as the first formula in question. But right after it 
needs to be asked if it bears moral relativism in itself. We may find a way out in 
order to set out the questioning. Prior to Protagoras, Xenophanes (570-480 BC) 
by objecting ironically to people, who had different conceptions of  God, told 
that “If cows,  horses and lions had hands, and were able to draw with their 
hands, and do the work men do, horses would draw images of gods like horses 
and cattle like cattle.”1 It may be assumed that through his assertion, 
Xenophanes criticized the relativist picture which dominated human minds in 
the antique times, as well as Karl Popper (1902-1994) who qualified to 
relativism as modern irrational system.2 Relativism also prevents its actuality in 
our today’s world. Whilst a certain number of philosophers courageously 
propound their thoughts in favour of relativism, the other majority puts 
forward their considerations against relativism. Well, it can be estimated that 
both the first group and the second group have presented their arguments and 
evidences in order to verify their assertions. Now, in this paper, their 
contentions shall be evaluated. I ought to mention that I shall refer to “moral 
relativism” by the concept of “relativism”.   
However, moral relativism includes moral subjectivism in terms of 
considering value pluralism with reference to individual, what we want to do is 
to show some remarks on cultural relativism with its arguments for/against by 
ignoring subjectivism due to limitation of space. Thus the aim of this piece of 
                                                          
1  From Clement of Alexandria, Strameteis, (within, Maria Baghramian, Relativism  (London: 
Routledge, 2004),  p. 23. 
2  Karl Popper, The Myth of Framework; In Defence of Science and Rationality (London: Routledge, 
1994), p. 33. 
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paper is to comment on the arguments for and against to cultural relativism in 
order to show weak points in supporting to cultural relativism.  
 The first thing to be done is to focus on what cultural relativism is in 
order to direct us to the concrete discussion. By speculating about what cultural 
relativism is and how we point out it and by which we refer to it, a field of 
work could be constructed. Having been concentrated on what cultural 
relativism is, whether or not it could be divided into the different categories 
shall be questioned and the issue shall be separated into two sections which 
explain the arguments for and against to cultural relativism. In the first section, 
basically, the supporting arguments for cultural relativism will be put forth and 
attempted to show the points of a defender of a form of moral relativism, 
namely Gilbert Harman. In the second section, the arguments against to 
cultural relativism will be presented and by considering a whole picture, we will 
attempt to indicate whether or not cultural relativism is strong and reasonable 
to be supported. 
 
1. Cultural Relativism 
A number of philosophers consider relativism as a common response to 
the deepest conflict people face in their daily life and they think that relativism 
is against to universal validity and justifiability.3 The issue, which is not new, 
cultural relativism, has ancient origins based on the works of a famous 
historian, Herodotus (484-425 BC). He gave place a couple of instances so as to 
show cultural differences. There is a well-known story related to cultural 
relativism in his book, The History. Darius, a king of ancient Persia, called 
Greeks to ask how much they would be paid before they would eat the bodies 
of their dead fathers. They answered by being shocked that no sum of money 
could have them do such a thing. Then Darius asked Callatians, an Indian tribe, 
customarily eating the bodies of their dead fathers, how much they would be 
paid before they would burn the bodies of their dead fathers. The answer was 
the same, no sum of money could get them to do such that.4 Cultural relativism 
has, therefore, been established firmly on a point that different cultures have 
different moral codes. 
 It should be taken into account that the discussions may be failed and 
no progress can be made, when philosophers sign on a certain meaning of 
                                                          
3   David Wong, Relativism, (within, Peter Singer Ed., A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1991), p. 442. 
4  Herodotus, The History, Book 3, Chapter: 38, trans. D.Grene (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1988) 
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cultural relativism. So it is suggested that cultural relativism is divided into two 
categories, namely, descriptive and normative cultural relativism. So that 
people, who want to speculate on cultural relativism, may reach a consensus at 
least they may express their ideas properly and more systematically.  
It need to be explained what is meant by the two categories, namely, 
normative cultural relativism and descriptive cultural relativism. Basically, it can 
be said that descriptive cultural relativism is based on empirical observations in 
varied societies. It is also said that different cultures have different systems of 
beliefs and values; this diversity would be in factual rather than in ethical. It is 
true that most societies have different judgments about value; this is rather 
anthropological and sociological assertion, as accepting descriptive cultural 
relativism.5 This factual assertion can be advanced by claiming that “two 
conflicting basic judgements may be equally valid.”6 In that case, it cannot be 
considered that there is universally absolute moral values and moral codes, and 
this process and the cast of mind leads to a conclusion; one ought to solely 
follow his own cultural moral codes. By this assertion, normative cultural 
relativism is revealed. Normative cultural relativism claims that “it is wrong to 
pass judgement on others who have substantially different values, or to try to 
make them conform to one’s values, for the reason that their values are as valid 
as one’s own.”7  
Descriptive cultural relativism might be accepted for it is just a factual 
assertion which mentions that there are different value perceptions from 
culture to culture without judging any moral consideration and asserting that 
two conflicting basic value judgements are equally true. It might be said that the 
society can perform differently whatever their general moral rules are.8 To be 
extended, descriptive cultural relativism is a soft account of cultural relativism. 
It should be questioned of whether it does give any way to universality of value 
and moral codes. At least, it may be asserted that descriptive cultural relativism 
is much closer to universality of value and universal moral codes than 
normative cultural relativism. For it does not have any claim on the validity of 
codes of any culture, its role is just to observe on cultures and to make note 
what it sees and thinks about different societies.  
To sum up, so far, we have referred to just two kinds of cultural 
relativism. One of them is descriptive cultural relativism and another one is 
normative cultural relativism. The former is a purely descriptive claim that 
                                                          
5  William Frankena, Ethics (New Jersey: Prentice Press, 1973), p. 109.  
6  Ibid, 109. 
7  David Wong, Relativism, p. 442. 
8  Bernard Gert, Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 118. 
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different societies disagree on at least a small number of moral judgments and 
considerations. Descriptive cultural relativism basically relies on factual claims 
and observations, and does not claim truthness and rightness of codes and 
norms of any society. On the other hand, the latter, i.e. normative cultural 
relativism conveys a claim about rightness of moral codes of any culture. It 
claims that people ought to comply with the moral norms and judgments of 
their own culture. When normative cultural relativism is accepted as a merely 
correct way, whether or not the claims that which convey the assertions of 
absolute or universal truth on morality can be questioned and the worry 
whether or not it can be talked about universal human rights, does, therefore, 
remain ambigous.  
  Thus, the actual problematic field in cultural relativism related to moral 
philosophy seems to be normative cultural relativism. It accepts the descriptive 
one’s claim but exceeds it. In this paper, the centre point will be on normative 
cultural relativism. Now, let us take a close look at the arguments for and 
against to normative cultural relativism. 
 
1.1. The Arguments For Cultural Relativism 
a) The Arguments From Cultural Diversity and Mind-Singled  
As a basis for normative cultural relativism, it is wrong to impose one’s 
morality on others.  Ruth Benedict (1887-1948), an important anthropologist 
claimed that what is thought as normalness-abnormalness varies greatly 
between societies, that is, normalness and anomalousness are indicated by 
societies within which they have appeared. So people live in pursuant of 
normalness and anomalousness of their cultures.9 “Moral rightness and 
wrongness vary from place to place without any absolute or universal moral 
standards that could apply to all persons at all times”10 Somehow language 
changes from society to society, it is normal that moral codes change according 
to cultures.11 In this view, a person, who lives in a particular society, is required 
to conform to society’s own moral codes in order to keep up with social life, 
since her/his society indicates the forms of normal and abnormal behaviour so 
that he can comply with. 
 Normative cultural relativists think that “moral beliefs and practices 
differ across cultures. Therefore no one set of moral beliefs has a monopoly on 
                                                          
9   Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (London: Penguin, 1934), p. 43. 
10  Tom Beauchamps, Philosophical Ethics  (New York: Mc Graw-Hill Publishing Company), p.  
33.  
11  Ibid., 34. 
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the truth.”12  So the argument from cultural diversity for cultural relativism can 
be formulated so; there is no single morality that is universally accepted (since 
empirical observations on societies show that, say cultural relativists) then there 
is no morality which ought to be universally followed. Human beings as moral 
beings follow their own societies’ forms of normal and abnormal behaviour in 
order to behave morally in the light of cultural relativism. But they do not find 
any universal moral codes and considerations, because simple-minded shows us 
there are a lot of moral codes relating to their cultures.  
It may be wondered whether or not we can deduct a claim saying that 
‘human beings ought to conform to their own cultural codes’ from merely 
factual observations say that ‘there are a great number of societies in which 
there are totally different moral codes and applications which cannot be 
reconciled with each other and there is no universal moral value at all’. J. 
Mackie, in order to show that there is no objective moral value, offered two 
arguments namely, the argument from relativity and the argument from 
queerness. Since the second one is concerned with directly subjectivity, 
therefore it will be ignored. Mackie explained the first one like this, “The 
argument from relativity has as its premise the well-known variation in moral 
codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also 
the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a 
complex community.”13 But still it remains equivocal whether we can conclude 
a value judgment from merely factual observations. I shall return this question 
later on.  
As it can be understood, normative cultural relativists would like to 
distinguish between the context of object and that of judgement. According to 
them, there can be two different ethical judgements about the same object. And 
they can be equally valid because judgements are made from the different 
judgement context.14 A judgement context can be constructed within a social 
environment, this point was touched by Gilbert Harman, for Harman is 
replaced in the next section, let us see Benedict’s points: “From the moment of 
his birth the customs into which he is born shape his experience and behaviour. 
By the time, he can talk, he is the little creature of his culture and by the time he 
is... able to take part in its activities, its habits are his habits, its beliefs his 
beliefs, its impossibilities, his impossibilities.”15  As mentioned before, the 
question of whether or not a value judgment can be concluded from merely 
                                                          
12  Benn Piers, Ethics (London: Routledge,  2003), p. 16. 
13  John Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977), p. 36. 
14  Stephen Darwal, Philosophical Ethics (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p.65. 
15  Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture, pp. 2-3. 
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factual observations remains unanswered.  Firstly, it would be thought that a 
society affects to a person, who lives in that society by its customs and 
traditions. However, it should not be meant that the society should completely 
shape the person’s moral character. Secondly, the societies, which 
unconsciously and paternalistically apply their internal ethical norms in order to 
regulate their own life, may apply other external and universal moral norms in 
favour of universal human rights, provided they learn more reasonable and 
effective moral norms. Thirdly, cultural relativism would seem morally wrong 
to its persons. As put forward at the beginning of section, it is morally wrong to 
impose one’s morality on others. This claim can also be accepted by normative 
cultural relativist. In this sense, is it acceptable for a normative cultural 
relativist, who claims that no one set of moral beliefs has a monopoly on the 
truth, to impose his own cultural moral codes to any member of his own 
culture? It is also wondered whether cultural relativism leads to cultural 
imperialism in the sense which we have questioned. 
b) The Argument from Tolerance and Harman’s Supporting 
Argument for Cultural Relativism 
It can be claimed that it is consistent to accept the fact that cultures 
appear to have at least a small number of different norms by which they live.16 
So they are right to expect respect from the different societies. And the fact 
that a given practice is morally wrong in one particular society does not entail 
that it is morally wrong in another. Since cultural relativism is based on a point 
that cultures disagree widely about morality;17 all cultures should be tolerant 
with each other.18 So it can be understood that tolerance should be a maxim for 
cultural relativists. By accepting tolerance, normative cultural relativists accept a 
universal mode. But in this case, which moral codes can be respected and 
which ones cannot, do not show us a certain criteria. So it may be offered a 
distinction between morals and mores. By the first concept, I mean morality, 
that is, the practices and treatment of people to each other. By the latter one, I 
mean harmless practices and traditions. Well, it can be morally right to claim 
that nobody ought to deliberately intrude and invade any one’s harmless mores 
and morals.  
Our claim should not be misunderstood. It also might be acceptable that 
every culture has at least a small number of moral codes, like tolerance or any 
other value or virtue, which cannot be contradict with anyone’s cultural ones. 
In the light of these speculations, whether or not the existence of universal 
                                                          
16  Dwight Furrow, Ethics (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 35. 
17  Harry Gensler, Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 16.  
18  David Wong, Moral Relativity (California: University of California Press, 1984), p. 181.  
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value like tolerance jeopardizes the claim of normative cultural relativism seems 
as a wonder. That is, for normative cultural relativist, tolerance is a highly 
important value in order to support and apply comfortably his/her own cultural 
moral codes against other cultural societies. Indeed, by giving place to tolerance 
as a moral value, he/she does not want any culture to intrude his/her culture. 
In that sense, he/she accepts a universal moral value. But what is the drawback 
to find out another universal moral value like tolerance and at the end of the 
process to reach a universal moral system?    
When passed on the other argument related to cultural relativism, an 
outstanding argument was presented by Gilbert Harman. It is impossible for us 
to discuss his all opinions owing to limitation of space but the most important 
parts can be introduced in the paper. 
Gilbert Harman firstly represents a pattern for relativism that he will 
translate into moral relativism later. According to Harman, “something that is 
moving in relation to one spetio-temporal framework can be at rest in relation 
to another.”19 His pattern of thought particularly concerned with relativism is 
converted into moral relativism in this way, “what is morally right in relation to 
one moral framework can be morally wrong in relation to a different moral 
framework. And no moral framework is objectively privileged as the one true 
morality.”20 
Gilbert Harman offers two concepts in order to logically defend 
(normative) cultural relativism, namely, inner judgements and moral bargaining 
(agreement). He puts forward firstly inner judgements. “(Inner) judgements in 
which we say that someone should or ought to have done something or that 
someone was right or wrong to have done something.”21 Inner judgement is 
shaped by (social) agreement within social context. Harman gives an example 
about related issue. “...Intelligent being from outer space land on Earth, there is 
no sound to judge their badly acting towards people, because they do not know 
concern for human life and happiness. To act badly towards people does not 
give them a reason to avoid the action.”22  According to Gilbert Harman, 
people can call them savages but they cannot tell that they ought not to have 
acted badly. Because Harman thinks that they have inner judgements 
constructed by their own context apart from human beings’.  
                                                          
19  Gilbert Harman-Judith Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1996) p. 3. 
20  Ibid,  p. 3. 
21  Gilbert Harman, “Moral Relativism Defended”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 84, No. 1, p. 5.  
22  Ibid, p. 5. 
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When it is looked at Harman’s concept of moral bargain, he says that 
“...relativism can be formulated as an intelligible thesis, the thesis that morality 
derives from an implicit agreement and that moral judgements are in a logical 
sense, made in relation to such agreement.”23 According to Harman, if speaker 
and audience share the same judgement, it can be said that they are in bargain 
with each other. But this agreement is valid only in a society. “‘By a moral 
system of coordinates’ I mean a set of values (standards, principles, etc.) 
perhaps on the model of the laws of one or another state. Whether something 
is wrong in relation to a given system of coordinates is to be determined by the 
system...”24 But I may question whether or not every society should reach an 
agreement on same judgments or rather whether mankind cannot be in bargain 
at least on minimal moral values, and whether there cannot be found out other 
possible ways more than two possible ways. That is, according to Harman, 
members of a society can either be in bargain or not on any specific matter. But 
it seems to us that Harman does not see other possible ways. For example, in a 
society, all people may not be on the same wave; moreover two different 
societies may agree with each other on a number of specific moral values and 
they can differ from each other in the sense of mores, which does not cause 
any damage to each other. So we can prolong the examples which may be 
thought that Harman does not consider. Harman attempts to put his 
speculations into practice by giving a concrete and a famous example on Hitler. 
Harman thinks that even though Hitler was an extraordinarily evil man, 
it cannot be said that Hitler was morally wrong since he depended on a 
principle reason (inner judgement and agreement in his society) that is not 
shared by most of today’s people. So should we judge Hitler with reference to 
our morality? According to Harman, it will be useless.25 The questionings 
whether or not Gilbert Harman is right on thinking so or to what extent he can 
be right shall be placed in the following section.  
 
1.2. The Arguments Against to Cultural Relativism 
a) The Practical and General Arguments Against to Cultural 
Relativism 
The arguments for normative cultural relativism have been explored in 
the first section. Here what we attempt to do is to examine into the contra-
arguments on normative cultural relativism. As seen, normative cultural 
                                                          
23  Ibid., p. 22. 
24  Gilbert Harman-Judith Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, p. 13. 
25  Gilbert Harman, “Moral Relativism Defended”, pp. 7-8. 
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relativists can object to universally absolute moral values by saying that morality 
is a product of culture, but they seem to ignore that even though all books are 
the product of their culture, they attempt to reveal universal truths.26 
Normative cultural relativists have deduced that there is no universally moral 
value from some empirical observations. But relevant to the subject Julia Driver 
says that “cultural differences are not evidence for the view that there is no 
universal truth to morality- there could be such non-relative truth, but people 
are mistaken about it or unaware of it, just as it was true that ‘the earth orbits 
the sun’ even 500 years ago when few people believed it.”27 Since normative 
cultural relativists have not allocated which one is wrong or right, they have 
accepted all things are true or wrong in their own context. But they have not 
thought there may be an authority for morality; somehow, despite of the fact 
that doctors have a raw on important issues, they are still expert and more 
faithful than a layman, that is, just as doctors are authorities on a number of 
specific topics, so cannot an authority be also accepted in morality? 
There is always a situation for normative cultural relativists to contradict 
themselves in practice on condition that we assume a possible world in which 
we can suppose that there is a relativist society within all societies are absolutist. 
According to relativist society, there of course, is not a universal truth. But we 
can also suppose that somehow all societies would be annihilated except the 
relativist ones. So henceforth, they would be mere society and no longer, they 
would be relativist but absolutist. Two points can be mentioned; even though 
this society is pure one, they accept that they are theoretically relativist. But in 
spite of the fact that they can accept themselves as relativist, they cannot show 
it in this possible world by their applications. So, on the one hand they will be 
so-called relativist, on the other hand, they will be absolutist. For they have 
internal norms which could impose their own member to conduct. It will bring 
about logically impossible ways. 
In the framework of cultural relativism, a person should follow his own 
group moral codes. But which group? As the person belongs to a number of 
societies, that is, he can convey a set of different roles in a society. Naturally in 
that case, he can live practical contradiction in cultural relativism. 
Normative cultural relativism claims that ‘something is good’ means that 
it is a socially approved in a society. But should the society include minority 
groups, will they always be wrong in the social context? Maybe a minority 
group is right in some issue. In that case, should they wait until they become 
                                                          
26  Harry Gensler, Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction, p. 16. 
27  Julia Driver, Ethics  (London: Blackwell, 2008), p. 19. 
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majority? This point seems to include some practical problems for normative 
cultural relativism. 
Supposing that a society, some people are colour blind; everyone claims 
that they like   red. But actually colour blind people like green without 
recognizing truth and how can they evaluate their knowledge on green or actual 
red? With reference to this analogy, Can it be said that there are some failing 
people in cultural relativism as well?  According to normative cultural relativists, 
the moral reformists such as prophets, intellectual activists and so on might be 
bad people for they acted against their social moral codes. However, they do 
not seem to give any proper evidence in order to show so. 
b) Mathematical-Logical Argument Against to Cultural 
Relativism  
It may seem a nice curiosity whether or not moral value is a priori. 
(David Ross) says that “he cannot decide whether or not to approve of 
something until we have a reason to do so; the reason why we approve of an 
action is that we recognise in it the attribute of rightness.”28 Most philosophers 
think that moral value about rightness can directly be comprehended; moral 
value should be based on reason and it should be a priori like mathematical 
objects.29 “We have to reason about what our goals should be on reason about 
the best way of accomplishing them.”30 Since this issue is quite controversial, 
we want to carry on by supposing that moral values are a priori like 
mathematical and geometrical values.  
What we would like to do is to translate cultural normative relativist 
language to mathematical language by making cultural relativist language 
symbolic. Cultural relativism claims that “all moralities are equally true;”31 so we 
can formulate and translate this premise into mathematical language as follows: 
A is socially approved, then it is true according to X society 
B is socially approved, then it is true according to Y society 
A=B because both of them are true with reference to internal norms 
which are valid for their own society, let me translate into mathematical 
language. If A=B; then 
A2=AB 
                                                          
28  Deborah Mabbet, An Introduction to Ethics (London: Hutchinson University Press, 1966),  p. 
93.  
29  Takiyettin Mengüşoğlu, Felsefeye Giriş (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi,, 2003), pp. 265-266. 
30  Dwight Furrow, Ethics, p. 34. 
31  David Wong, Relativism, p. 446. 
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A2-B2=AB-B2 




If moral value is a priori like mathematical value, then how can the 
mathematical process be explained even though we know the process totally 
wrong? It can be said that it is a self-contradictory process according to 
mathematical language; therefore cultural relativism is self-contradictory in 
itself. 
c) The Critical Thoughts on Tolerance Argument and Harman’s 
Points 
Is tolerance compulsory for normative cultural relativism? Relativists 
generally say that tolerance is morally virtuous. But for whom toleration is 
virtuous? Should it be for everyone then, a normative cultural relativist society 
has at least one moral value to which applies universally.32 Someone says that 
“each community is correct unless they are absolutists.” But this premise 
stipulates actually tolerance for every society except absolutist one. By this 
premise, normative cultural relativism will be useless; secondly, it will 
decompose its own argument. Basically to offer tolerance unquestioningly is a 
kind of absolutism. For the society which is not absolutist should explain its 
claim to their people who might be absolutist. If it says to them, this is our 
compulsory moral code as a society; you must compulsorily behave in pursuant 
of tolerance. Does not it refute its relativist claims? 
Let us take a closer look at Harman’s points. As it can be remembered 
that he says that people can call Hitler as an evil and a bad person; but they 
cannot say that Hitler ought not to have acted so due to fact that they do not 
share the inner judgements and the agreement with Hitler. So people cannot 
condemn him in this case. This point seems to convey some weakness in itself. 
Bernard Gert says that “those who held that a person cannot make any moral 
judgements about people in other societies can hold ethical relativism, for 
example, that only Germans living at the time can condemn Hitler.”33 This 
limitation seems absurd for people, if there is a savagery without any proper 
reason in any society, this can be called as an atrocity by all member of the 
world. Because it is against universal human right, because it is against moral 
                                                          
32  Benn Piers, Ethics, p. 19. 
33  Bernard Gert, Morality, p. 9.  
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thinking, because it is against conscience. On the other hand, it might be said 
that there is no point in coming social reformers to the backward societies in 
Harman’s point, since the duty cannot be reconsidered in the aspect of the 
society whose members apply to only internal moral codes for their internal 
applications and interactions. 
Suppose that a society has the history of massacre, but then society 
changes its history with better one by giving up massacre, and the society 
criticizes itself for former actions. It can accept its fault about why it would not 
return from error earlier. This case does not seem to be explained by the inner 
judgements in Harman’s context, because he talked about the inner judgements 
but did not mention how they can be changed.  
 
CONCLUSION 
So far we have attempted to indicate whether normative cultural 
relativism is conceivable and supportable by highlighting the arguments 
for/against it. We consider that despite of the fact that normative cultural 
relativism has some arguments and supporters, it seems a little queer and self-
contradictory. It can be clarified to imperialise culture by imposing own culture 
on another one is something, to tell reasonably rightness and wrongness of any 
society is another thing. It seems to me more plausible to accept normative 
cultural relativism as contradictory in itself and insufficient to approach the 
issues.  
We could reasonably think that there should be general and universal 
criteria over which moral norms are evaluated and to which apply all cultural 
societies and on which all the members of the world make a minimal 
consensus. By the way, the criteria should not be bound up any cultural 
background and cultural society. Nowadays, people can compromise on a 
number of moral norms with each other, and this experience indicates that 
people reach the universal moral codes which can be applied to all cultural 
societies. It can be also reasonable that every society can have a different set of 
lives. But it may be allowed them as long as they are harmless and till an extent 
in which no offence is against to universal human rights. They can be called 
mores, which are harmless practices conducted by different societies out of 
morals. People do not have to conform to mores, or rather they may not be 
judged provided they do not abide by them. This classification may provide us 
a possible way out. 
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The second way out possibly also can be alleged, for presenting it, there 
are a small number of concepts to introduce.34   
Internal interactions or practices, by them, I mean interactions or 
practices that involve only members of the same culture that is, practices only 
conducted by members of an internal society.   
External interactions or practices, by them, I mean interactions or 
practices that involve members of different cultures that is, practices which may 
be conducted by both member of an internal society and members of an 
external society.   
An internal norm, by this, I mean a norm of a culture that applies only to 
the culture's internal interactions or practices, that is, internal norms are only 
valid for the alleged society. Their members act morally with reference to 
internal norms.   
An external norm, by this, I mean a norm of a culture that applies to the 
culture's external interactions or practices, that is, external norms may be valid 
for every society regardless of their internal norms.   
In the first section we have seen the difference between mores and 
morals can be considered. Mores are harmless traditions and actions which may 
be differentiated from one culture to another, and it is not flaw to evaluate 
mores in accordance with internal norms. Morals are practices and treatment of 
people to each other, then there may appear the second way out.  
Thus, there may not seem problematic to mention that internal norms 
can apply to mores which are valid only as internal practices and to also 
mention that external norms may reasonably apply to morals which are as 
external practices and interactions which can be accepted at least minimally by 
members of all societies.     
It seems to morally and logically right to assert that there could be 
universally acknowledged external norms on which any culture bases at least in 





                                                          
34  William J. Talbott,  http://faculty.washington.edu/wtalbott/phil338/trrelative.htm 
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